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ABSTRACT 
 
The last years are witnessing a number of initiatives worldwide devoted to assess the safety levels of the unmanned 
aircraft. These initiatives are very heterogeneous; some of them are centred in airworthiness aspects while others 
focus on operations. From the point of view of a potential UAS manufacturer the actual situation is plenty of 
uncertainties in relation to the regulations to be applied for certifying the design, manufacturing and maintenance, 
and from the point of view of the potential operator the situation is analogous with respect to operational procedures. 
In the present work the emphasis is on the manufacturer’s situation. The objective of this work is to clarify the 
present civil airworthiness regulatory scene by summarizing all the regulatory efforts up to date and preparing a 
comparative analysis of them. In this comparison, the manned regulations are included too. The most representative 
state-of-the-art UAS are analyzed from the point of view of the existing and the future regulatory framework. The 
main aspects to be considered are related to the airworthiness certification (performances, structural design, etc) for 
which a quantitative comparison is established in order to clarify how the new regulatory framework, mainly based 
on the conventional aircraft certification codes, will affect future UAS, compared to the existing regulations. 
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Introduction 
The so-called UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) are 
complete systems designed for flying without a 
human pilot on board and include, following EASA 
(1, 2), not only the UAV (Unmanned Aircraft 
Vehicle) but also the systems that allow the proper 
operation, as the control station, the communications 
link and the launch and recovery systems. 
From 1917, when the first controlled flight of an 
unmanned aircraft (Curtiss N-9 US NAVY) took 
place (3), the development of the UAS has been 
notable especially in the military field and during 
recent war periods. This great evolution of the UAS 
has caused an important diffusion of these systems 
nowadays, making it necessary to establish an 
adequate regulatory frame which allows the safe 
operation of these aircraft in military, civil or 
commercial missions. 
Nowadays the problem is partially solved, being the 
general solution to require operating the UAS outside 
of the non-segregated airspace or, sometimes to book 
timer fractions inside it in such a way that the UAS 
could be safely operated. 
A relevant milestone was the accident of a Predator B 
UAS (Maximum Take-off Weight, MTOW, 4763 kg) 
in Sierra Vista (Arizona, USA) in April 25th 2006. 
This fact highlighted the necessity of facing the 
problem of the regulation of the operations. The 
aircraft was performing surveillance tasks in the 
border between the United States and Mexico when 
the blockage of one of the consoles of the ground 
control station stopped the communications link with 
the vehicle and the control was lost. A chain of 
failures in the troubleshooting procedure lead to the 
unexpected closure of the fuel valve. From that 
moment the aircraft began losing height and went out 
of the sight line of the control station, making the 
control of the vehicle irrecoverable. Although there 
were no human damages, the NTSB (US National 
Transport Safety Board) investigated this accident 
thoroughly and issued, subsequently, several 
recommendations related to the design, operation and 
safety, addressed to organizations that operate UAS 
(4, 5). 
Many regulatory initiatives have emerged, trying to 
organize the UAS operations in the non-segregated 
airspace (EUROCONTROL, JAA/EUROCONTROL 
UAV-TF, EASA A-NPA Nº 16/2005, EUROCAE 
WG-73, EDA, DoD, FAA, RTCA, NATO). By the 
moment, none of them have led to a firm regulation 
which could unify the requirements for UAS 
operation, exhibiting an equivalent level of safety 
(ELOS) similar to the manned aircraft (conventional). 
The absence of a set of unified regulations is leading 
presently to a slowing down of the development and 
usage of the UAS. 
The UAS will have to use the airspace to perform 
their missions, civil or military. Such airspace has a 
structure, management and control designed to be 
exploited by manned aircraft, which are required to 
have a very high level of safety. The level of safety of 
the conventional aircraft relies in their intrinsic 
characteristics, the maintenance technicians and 
operating personnel. From a point of view different 
from aircraft characteristics, such level of safety also 
depends on the qualities of the navigation aids and 
the air traffic control and management which 
supervise and organize the UAS missions. 
Up to date the unmanned aircraft vehicles operations 
are restricted to the segregated airspace; that is, 
airspace regions where the conventional aircraft also 
flies but in which some areas, previously announced, 
are segregated for special traffic. In order to access 
these areas, some segregated airways are provided 
trying to minimize conflicts between UAS and within 
the airspace of each nation in order to avoid the 
establishment of international agreements in this 
matter. 
The question that now arises is how the operation of 
UAS could be allowed in the non-segregated 
airspace, at the same time as the conventional aircraft, 
helping UAS to develop all their potential. To this 
end it is necessary to convince the airworthiness and 
operations authorities that the unmanned aircraft are 
able to develop the same level of safety as the 
manned ones. So the UAS are not a hazard for the 
other traffic and for the persons and goods on ground. 
For reaching such scenario it is necessary to solve not 
only the lack of regulations but also the development 
of high reliable technologies that allow UAS to reach 
equivalent levels of safety as the manned aircraft. 
Keeping in mind the options stated by several 
regulators (1, 6, 7, 8), it is possible to enumerate the 
premises that all integration regulation initiatives 
should consider: 
 UAS should reach equivalent levels of safety 
as conventional manned aircraft. 
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 UAS operations should not increase the risks 
for the users of the non-segregated 
airspace, nor third parties. 
 UAS should use the same ATM procedures 
and the same flight rules as the other users 
of the airspace. 
 The air traffic services given to the UAS 
should be transparent to the other users and 
the air traffic controllers. 
These integration premises can be resumed as four 
problems to be solved: airworthiness certification, 
interaction with ATM, interaction with other aircraft 
and flight crew certification. In this work only the 
first problem will be considered. In the first part, the 
existing airworthiness certification initiatives will be 
resumed. Then, the recent EASA Policy will be 
analyzed. This analysis will be extended, in the third 
section, to a case study in which 23 real UAS will be 
analyzed from the point of view of the new regulatory 
framework and the existing certification codes for 
manned aircraft trying to quantify the impact of the 
application of these regulations to a relevant design 
aspect, such as the structural weight.  
1 Current State of the Airworthiness 
Certification Initiatives  
In order to guarantee equivalent levels of safety as the 
conventional aircraft, it will be necessary to provide 
internationally accepted standard and recommended 
practices to assess the safety of the vehicle and its 
operations. They should include the safety evaluation 
of all systems on board and their integration 
characteristics required to develop their design 
missions. In this way it would be possible to certify 
the “intrinsic” or “potential” airworthiness of the 
UAS (9). Also it will be necessary to certify the 
“real” airworthiness, that is, the ability of the UAS of 
continuously being airworthy through a proper 
operation and maintenance so the UAS permanently 
keep its “intrinsic” airworthiness. This means that it 
will be important to foresee the qualifications for the 
maintenance and operations personnel, in a way 
similar as the conventional aviation.  
From the point of view of the existing regulations for 
the airworthiness certification of the vehicle, up to 
date there is no civil code of regulations edited by any 
authority. Nevertheless there are several military 
codes and several civil regulation initiatives. A 
summary of the actual situation is presented 
afterwards. From the point of view of the civil 
initiatives, the situation is rather different in the 
United States than in Europe. 
In the United States of America, the FAA (Federal 
Aviation Administration) has established the 
Unmanned Aircraft Programme Office (UAPO), who 
is in charge of the UAS integration process into the 
U.S. NAS (U.S. National Airspace). By the moment, 
until a new FAR for UAS appears (expected by the 
end of 2011), UAPO has developed a set of 
certifications and authorizations for UAS. In the case 
of civil operations, it will be necessary to ask for a 
special airworthiness certification in the experimental 
category. As the experimental category is very wide 
and comprises a great variety of aircraft, the case of 
UAS is specially considered in FAA Order 8130.34 
(10). It should be pointed out that FAR Part 21 (11) 
prevents the use of the UAS in commercial missions. 
Finally it is important to note that FAA Order 
8130.34 (10) is not a detailed airworthiness code, but 
a set of operational limitations.   
In the case of public operations, FAA will issue a 
Certificate of Authorization (COA) or Waiver which 
represent a temporary procedural interim mechanism 
authorizing UAS flight for a special purpose and into 
a limited area. The objective of the FAA together 
with the public organization operating the UAS, is to 
obtain the same ELOS with the COA than the manned 
aircraft. Finally, for the issue of the COA, the FAA 
has published some recommendations (12), in which 
the military code MIL-HDBK-516-B (13) is strongly 
recommended as a guidance code. 
There is another possibility of operating an UAS in 
the NAS, and it is under the FAA’s Advisory Circular 
AC 91-57 (14) related to model aircraft. In order to 
clarify the applicability of this AC for the operation 
of UAS, the FAA has published its opinion (15) and 
has created (16) the Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
for Small UAS (sUAS), who has regulated the 
commercial applications of small UAS for which the 
AC 91-57 is not applicable. The recommendations of 
the sUAS ARC for creating a new regulatory 
framework for these aircraft has been published 
elsewhere (17) and look like a sFAR code. The 
philosophy followed by the sUAS ARC has been to 
adopt the same certification criteria as in the Light-
Sport aircraft category, in which the manufacturer 
must show compliance with some identified 
consensus standards instead of creating a new 
detailed airworthiness code. Nevertheless the sUAS 
should comply with the essential requirements 
published in Appendix B of (17). 
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Between civil and military initiatives, and between 
the United States and Europe, it is the NATO code 
STANAG 4671 (18), ratified in 2007. This document 
contains a set of airworthiness regulations addressed 
to certify military fixed wing UAS with a MTOW 
between 150-20000 kg which will operate in the non 
segregated airspace. The purpose of this code is to 
obtain ELOS for the affected UAS similar to the fixed 
wing aircraft certified with FAR Part 23 and EASA’s 
CS-23 codes (from which it comes from). At the same 
time it includes some special features of the UAS are 
recognized through new subparts, so Subparts A to G 
come from CS-23 and from H to I, they are new parts 
devoted to communications, command and control 
data link and ground control station, all of them 
specific UAS topics. 
 In Europe, and in the military field, there are two 
codes: the British DEF STAN 00-979 Part 9 (19) and 
the French USAR (20). The first one is the ninth 
volume, devoted to UAV systems, of a collection that 
compiles airworthiness and design requirements for 
aircraft under the responsibility of the Defence 
Ministry of the United Kingdom. The Part 9 includes 
certification requirements for UAS including design, 
development and testing topics, directed to the 
operation of such UAS in any class of airspace. This 
code has been used to complement JAR/CS-23 codes 
in the codification of NATO STANAG 4671. 
The French code, USAR, has been developed by the 
Délégation Générale pour l’Armament (French 
Defence Ministry) and it is compulsory for all 
military French UAS. It is based on the EASA’s CS-
23 code, tailored to fixed wing UAS (tactical, MALE, 
HALE and UCAV). This code is the basis for the 
previously considered NATO STANAG 4671. 
From the civil point of view, the regulatory 
competence in Europe for unmanned aircraft with an 
operative mass over 150 kg relies on EASA, as it is 
established in its Basic Regulation (21), art. 4, section 
4. For that reason, on 2005, the Agency began the 
rulemaking process issuing an A-NPA (Advance-
Notice of Proposed Amendment), A-NPA 16-2005 
(1) centred on the establishment of a policy (and later 
on a Certification Specification code) on UAS 
certification. 
Before 2005 and almost at the time of appearing the 
older Basic Regulation (22) which created EASA, a 
joint JAA-Eurocontrol initiative appeared: “The Joint 
JAA/Eurocontrol Initiative on UAVs – UAV Task 
Force”. That project aimed at the development of a 
model for regulating UAS. The initiative was fruitful 
and its Final Report (8) appeared on May 2004, 
which is essential to understand the actual point of 
view of EASA on UAS integration. This Report 
presents a deep multidisciplinary analysis on the 
future establishment of a regulatory frame for UAS, 
including safety/security, airworthiness, operational 
approvals, maintenance and licenses, but not ATM. It 
is composed of a central body, two Annexes and five 
attachments. The conclusions of this work have been 
capital to form the EASA’s view, so the approach 
followed by the Agency in its A-NPA 16/2005 is 
based on the scheme marked in the JAA/Eurocontrol 
Task Force.  
The EASA’s A-NPA is the basis for the future 
European regulation on UAS, with a MTOW greater 
than 150 kg and not explicitly excluded by the Basic 
Regulation (21). The philosophy of the document 
follows the conclusions of the JAA/Eurocontrol Task 
Force, maintaining the two possible approaches for 
the new regulation:  
1. Conventional: tailoring to UAS, in specified 
conditions, the existing code for manned 
aircraft. 
2. Safety objectives: creating completely new 
regulations based on complying total safety 
objectives and centred on the most relevant 
hazards. 
Among these alternatives, the first one was selected 
for the new regulation but the second one would be 
used when necessary (for instance through the issue 
of restricted airworthiness certificates), as it was 
established in the JAA /Eurocontrol Task Force Final 
Report. 
For selecting the appropriate manned airworthiness 
CS code used as the design standard for every UAV 
system, the A-NPA document presents two 
alternatives too that in future regulations will be 
reduced to one: 
 Alternative 1: Impact energy method. The 
method compares the hazard presented by a 
UAV with that of existing conventional 
aircraft to obtain an indication of the 
appropriate level of requirements which 
should be applied. The most significant 
feature of this proposal is that it relies on a 
comparison with existing conventional 
aircraft design requirements which 
contribute to a currently accepted level of 
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safety, and avoids controversial assumptions 
about future contributions to that level of 
safety from operational, environmental or 
design factors. The comparison criterion is 
based on the fact that the capability of a 
vehicle to harm any third parties is broadly 
proportional to its kinetic energy on impact. 
For the purposes of the comparison method 
it is assumed that there are only two kinds of 
impact: either the impact arises as a result of 
an attempted emergency landing under 
control (unpremeditated descent scenario), 
or it results from complete loss of control 
(loss of control scenario). Once the kinetic 
energy for each scenario is computed it is 
possible to determine the appropriate CS 
code to be applied. Then it would be 
necessary to construct a certification basis 
which addresses the same aspects of the 
design as the existing codes, and to the level 
indicated by the kinetic energy comparison. 
Special conditions would be required for any 
novel features of the design not addressed by 
the existing codes.   
 Alternative 2: Method based on UAV safety 
objectives. Safety objectives have been used 
as a means to define and justify the civil 
aircraft characteristics. These safety 
objectives are oriented to on board people 
protection and are defined by the FAR/CS 
25/23 regulations. As there are no people on 
board of UAV, safety objectives criteria for 
UAV must be redefined and oriented to on 
ground people protection. By comparing 
today aircraft safety objectives (as they are 
defined in the regulations) to the UAV 
proposed safety objective, a correspondence 
between CS-23/25 and UAV categories is 
established. Three main parameters have 
been considered: statistical aircraft fatal 
losses, technical aircraft losses defined in the 
regulations and catastrophic failures. 
Following its rulemaking procedure, EASA published 
the A-NPA 16/2005 as a “policy document” in order 
to receiving proposals from other institutions and 
completing the regulation before arriving at a 
consolidated version. During this process, the Agency 
and interested parties (National Authorities, 
manufacturers, etc) interacted, and the results were 
compiled in the CRD 16/2005 document (2). This 
document was issued on December 2007 and was 
opened for comments until February 2008. It 
compiled 320 comments from 45 different sources. 
These comments or suggestions, after being studied 
by EASA, can be identified as accepted, partially 
accepted, considered (accepted but meaning no 
changes in the text) or rejected. The main topics 
affected have been: 
 Development for a global new regulatory 
mainframe for UAS: the A-NPA is only a 
first step. 
 Regulation for UAS with MTOW<150 kg 
(out of  EASA’s scope): the EASA response 
is that the Agency is not competent in this 
area, as it is stated in the Basic Regulation 
(21,22) but the Member States are. 
Nevertheless the Agency agrees in the high 
interest of having a harmonized opinion and 
also in the collaboration of EUROCAE WG-
73 as a developer of a set of certification 
guidelines. Nowadays it is JARUS1 who is in 
charge of harmonizing and developing the 
draft versions on a new European rule for 
this light UAS category (LUAS) taking as 
basis the CS-VLA and CS-VLR 
airworthiness European rules.  
 Coordination with military working groups: 
considered. There are comments that suggest 
using the USAR code for military UAS. 
 Conventional vs. safety target approach: the 
comments related with retaining the 
conventional approach based on the existing 
CS codes have been accepted.  
 Total System Approach (TSA2): the Agency 
answers that the European Single Sky is the 
final aim but it is far from the currently 
objectives. 
 Regulation of the Sense & Avoid systems: 
there were many comments related the 
necessity of regulation for these systems. 
EASA maintains the opinion that Sense 
&Avoid systems should be regulated by the 
organization responsible of ATM. 
                                                 
1 JARUS: Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on UAS; 
an international coordination group initiated and 
chaired by CAA The Netherlands,  formed by eleven 
European National Authorities and coordinated with 
Australia, Canada and USA Authorities. 
2 TSA: Total System Approach; progressive 
integration of the complete aviation system. 
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 Security: considered. EASA will have to 
toughen its rule in order to improve the 
protection against intruders. 
 Design Organization Approvals, DOA, for 
UAS manufacturers: partially accepted. 
 Airworthiness certificate and control 
stations: accepted comments related the 
request of one airworthiness certificate for 
each UAV-control station. 
 Environmental protection and noise: 
considered. The rules related to noise 
emissions and environmental protection 
should be the same as for existing manned 
codes, but the possibility of amending them 
is opened, if necessary.  
2 Recent Advances: EASA Policy Statement 
After a public discussion in the EU after the A-NPA 
and CRD publication, the Agency has finally stepped 
forward in the rulemaking procedure for UAS and has 
issued a new Policy Statement document (23) on 
September 2009. This policy establishes general 
principles for type-certification (including 
environmental protection) of an Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS). The policy complies with the current 
provisions of the Basic Regulation (21), Regulation 
(EC) Nº 1702/2003 (24) and all Management Board 
Decisions relating to product certification. This 
policy shall be used by the Agency’s staff when 
certificating UAS. The policy represents a first step in 
the development of comprehensive civil UAS 
regulation and may be regarded as providing 
guidance to Part 21 Subpart B of Regulation (EC) Nº 
1702/2003: Type-certificates and restricted type-
certificates; operational regulations pertaining to 
UAS are not addressed within this document. This 
policy statement is therefore an interim solution to aid 
acceptance and standardisation of UAS certification 
procedures and will be replaced in due course by 
AMC and guidance material to Part-21 when more 
experience has been gained. 
The main topics covered by the policy statement are 
the following: 
 Routine case: The issue by the Agency of a 
type-certificate (TC) will be based upon the 
applicant demonstrating compliance with a 
defined type-certification basis and a 
certificate of airworthiness (CofA) is granted 
to an individual UAS when compliance with 
the approved type design has been shown. 
Any applicant applying for UAS type-
certificate is required to demonstrate their 
capability by holding a design organisation 
approval (DOA), issued in accordance with 
Part-21 subpart J. 
 Alternate approach (within the scope of Part-
21): to facilitate an early introduction of 
civil UAS operations, it will be possible to 
apply for an airworthiness approval. This 
approach recognises that some UAS may 
benefit from a stepwise approach in 
conjunction with the issue of a restricted TC 
and/or restricted CofA. This alternative may 
be based on the safety target approach, using 
an overall target level of safety defined by 
the Agency, in lieu of a specified 
airworthiness code. 
 UAS control stations and other remote 
equipment performing functions that can 
prejudice take-off, continued flight, landing 
or environmental protection, shall be 
considered as part of the aircraft and 
included in the type-certification basis.  
 The applicable airworthiness code or codes 
to be used as reference for establishing the 
type-certification basis will be proposed by 
the applicant using a methodology for 
selecting the applicable manned aircraft 
code defined in A-NPA 16/2005. A tailoring 
of the code should be proposed by the 
applicant, in a justified manner. 
 The Agency acknowledges that USAR (20) 
developed by the French Military 
Authorities, and later updated by NATO 
FINAS group to STANAG 4671 (18), has 
been developed using a methodology closely 
related to the one described in the EASA’s 
policy. At an applicant’s request, the Agency 
may accept USAR version 3, STANAG 
4671 (18), or later updates, as the reference 
airworthiness code used in setting the type-
certification basis provided that the code 
identified by the methodology of the Policy 
does not indicate that safety standards in 
excess of CS-23 are required, and the safety 
targets included in the system safety 
assessment reflect values resulting from the 
application of this policy. 
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 There are several special conditions covered 
in the Policy, for which the Agency includes 
some guidance. These conditions are the 
following: emergency recovery capability, 
command and control link, level of 
autonomy, human machine interface, control 
station, types of operation and system safety 
assessment. 
 Other issues considered are the application 
of Part-21 subpart I for noise certificates, 
and Annex I of Part-M of Regulation (EC) 
Nº 2042/2003 (25) for the continuing 
airworthiness, and the Agency’s point of 
view on the certification of “detect and 
avoid” systems.  
Finally, it will be necessary to wait until all these 
aforementioned initiatives culminate in a specific 
airworthiness code for UAS although the main bases 
have been already established. Figure 1 summarizes 
the actual UAS regulatory scene, and the relationship 
among all actors in the international playfield.  
Figure 1.- Actual regulatory international playing field for UAS 
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3 Study Case: Application of the EASA      
Policy Statement to Existing UAS 
As it has been summarized before, there are a number 
of initiatives worldwide devoted to establish 
requirements that allow the integration of UAS in the 
non-segregated airspace maintaining the same ELOS 
as for the manned aircraft. These initiatives are very 
inhomogeneous, some of them are centred in 
airworthiness aspects while other do the same in 
relation to operations. From the point of view of a 
potential UAS manufacturer, the actual situation is 
plenty of uncertainties concerning with the 
regulations to be applied for certifying the design, 
manufacturing and maintenance; and from the point 
of view of the potential operator the situation is 
analogous in relation to operational procedures.  
The objective of this section is to present a case study 
in which representative state-of-the-art UAS will be 
analyzed from the point of view of the existing and 
foreseen regulatory frameworks. EASA’s Policy 
Statement is the regulatory initiative selected for the 
study; so the UAS will be analyzed following the 
methodology presented in the Policy. The output of 
this exercise will be the manned code or codes 
associated to each UAS studied. Then a quantitative 
analysis, centred in structural aspects, will be applied 
to the UAS trying to extract general conclusions 
about how new regulations are going to affect future 
UAS design. 
Table 1 summarizes the main data of twenty-three 
state-of-the-art UAS. Their sizes and missions are 
representative of the actual market, the MTOW 
ranging between 3 and 11600 kg. First, the 
methodology for selecting the applicable 
airworthiness code(s) complied in Appendix 1 of the 
EASA’s Policy Statement is applied to the selected 
UAS. This methodology comes from the “Alternative 
1” published in the EASA A-NPA Nº 16/2005 (1). As 
explained in Section 3 of this document, it is 
necessary to calculate the kinetic energy on impact in 
two scenarios: unpremeditated descent and loss of 
control. Thus, the kinetic energy has been calculated 
for the 23 selected UAS for both scenarios. These 
values have been introduced into Figures 1 and 2 of 
the Appendix 1 of the A-NPA. Figure 1 provides an 
indication of the standards to be applied to any 
feature of the design whose failure would affect the 
ability to maintain safe altitude above the ground. 
Figure 2 provides an indication of the standards to be 
applied to any feature of the design whose failure 
would affect the ability to maintain control 
(particularly rate of descent). Clearly, this must 
include the primary structure. An analogous exercise 
has been done for “Alternative 2” of the A-NPA Nº 
16/2005 for comparison purposes, although this 
alternative has not been adopted in the EASA’s 
Policy Statement. For applying “Alternative 2”, it is 
necessary to estimate the crash energy (proportional 
to the kinetic energy) and the lethal crash area 
(correlated from an expression that relates MTOW 
and wing area). Then the number of potential ground 
victims is estimated, based on the lethal area and on 
population density. The crash probability and safety 
objectives can thus be determined. On comparing 
today manned aircraft safety objectives (as defined in 
the regulations) to the UAS proposed safety 
objectives a correspondence between CS-23 
categories/CS-25 and UAS categories is established. 
Through the values estimated for the lethal crash area, 
the A-NPA provides a first equivalence table between 
the UAS and the manned airworthiness codes. A 
second equivalence table relates the UAS safety 
objectives, measured in terms of crash probability per 
flying hour, with the various CS-23 categories or 
military category. The results obtained on applying 
these methods to the selected UAS are compiled in 
Table 2.  
In parallel to the methodology developed by EASA, 
there are other researchers in the United States (26, 
27) that also work on the way of selecting an 
airworthiness code to be used for UAS among those 
existing for manned aircraft. In this case study these 
investigations are taken into account too for 
comparison purposes.   
The aforementioned research work (26,27) is 
established under the philosophy of safety target 
approach, following the orientation of the 1209 AMC 
section of EASA CS-25 code where a risk reference 
system is proposed relating the category of an event 
including injuries and/or fatalities with its frequency 
of occurrence. The problem now is to define an 
ELOS for UAS based in this concept. The worst 
scenario is the one in which there are fatalities, so the 
ELOS need to be defined exclusively on the fatality 
rate. When the ELOS has been defined, the target 
level of safety (TLS) can be determined as the 
maximum acceptable frequency of an accident, 
among all the possible accidents. Having in mind that 
the scenario includes fatalities, in the particular case 
of UAS, the accident involving fatalities are only two 
types: ground impact and mid-air collisions. Both of 
them implies a figure for the fatality rate of fF = 10-7 
h-1, or less, to be consistent with that of the manned 
aircraft. Nevertheless the mid-air collision scenario  
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Figure 2.- EASA A-NPA Nº 16/2005 (1) Appendix 1- Figures 1 (unpremeditated descent scenario) and 2 (loss of 
control scenario) corresponding to the Impact Energy Methodology. Also depicted in the EASA Policy Statement 
(22). 
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 Type Range 
(km)
Endurance Altitude 
(m) 
MTOW 
(kg)
ALADIN Micro 15 more than 1 h 150 3 
MANTA Mini 37 6 - 8 h 4870 27,7
FULMAR Mini 800 8 h 2000 20 
FUROS CR 20  6 h 3000 11 
TARIDAN MASTIFF CR 30,5  7 h 30 min 4480 138 
LIPAN M3 SR 40 5 h 2000 60 
RHEINMETALL KZO SR 100 3 h 30 min 2000 161
OUTRIDER TACTICAL UAV MR >200  4,9 h  4570 174,73 
RQ-2 PIONEER MR 185 5 h 4600 204,12
T-16 ARCTURUS LALE 37 12 - 24 h 3657,6 37 
APOENA 3000 LALE 3000  24 h 3000 82 
RQ-1 PREDATOR MALE 726  24 h 7620 855 
MQ 9 REAPER MALE 5926 14 - 28 h 7500 4760
RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK HALE 25928 24 - 48 h 20000 11600
nEUROn HALE 100 100min 14000 6500 
EADS BARRACUDA UCAV high range long endurance 6096 3250
X-45 A UCAV 920 long endurance 10670 5528
IAI SEARCHER  LADP 250-300  18 h 6096 426 
RQ 5 HUNTER LADP 150   8 - 10 h 4876,8 726 
MANTARRAYA DEC 100 4 h 3000 60 
RADIO PLANE OQ 2 DEC 1 h 2440 47 
TREK AEROSPACE DRAGONFLY MRE 
(Rotary)
925  3 h 3900 485 
CL-327 GUARDIAN MRE 
(Rotary) 
200  6,25 h 5500 350 
Table 1.- Main characteristic of the state-of-the-art UAS selected. (LALE - Low Altitude Low Endurance; LADP – 
Low Altitude Deep Penetration; DEC - Decoy) 
will not be considered because it is almost impossible 
to be modelled due to enormous difficulties in 
modelling the exact UAS trajectories, the daily air 
traffic (only a small portion is ATM controlled), the 
absence of flight plan and the differences in on board 
“sense and avoid” systems installed. 
Although a TLS for the fatality rate cannot be directly 
used as a design standard, it is possible to determine 
the appropriate system reliability under various 
conditions to achieve it. A mathematical expression 
can be obtained for the best variable to reflect the 
TLS in a ground impact, which is the minimum 
required time between impacts, TGI,min:   
 exp1,min ,max (fatality/exposure)GI GI
F
A
T f P
f
   (1) 
being Aexp the ground area in which general people is 
exposed to potential harm due to a ground impact,  
the population density, fF the fatality rate required, 
and P(fatality/exposure) the fatality probability given 
the exposure. The reference data for calculating the 
TGI,min have been an Aexp equal to the reference UAV 
area (wing surface) augmented by a small buffer to 
account for the width of an average human (26, 27), a 
population density of 200 people per km2 (26,27), a 
fatality rate fF of 10-8 h-1 (27), and a fatality 
probability P(fatality/exposure) equal to the following 
expression (26,27): 
  
   1
4
1(fatality/exposure)
1
sp
imp
P
E
 


     
(2) 
being α the impact energy threshold required for a 
fatality probability of 50% with ps=0,5, β the impact 
energy threshold required to cause a fatality as ps 
goes to zero, and ps is a sheltering parameter [0,1] 
which determines how exposed is the population to an 
impact. The values of the previous parameters have 
been investigated by Dalamagkidis et al (26, 27),  
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 Impact Energy UAV Safety 
 Kinetic Energy Lethal Crash Area Crash Probability 
ALADIN Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
MANTA Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
FULMAR Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military 
FUROS Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military 
TARIDAN MASTIFF Microlight/CS-VLA CS-VLA Military
LIPÁN M3 Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
RHEINMETALL KZO Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight /CS-VLA Military 
OUTRIDER TACTICAL 
UAV 
Microlight/CS-VLA CS-VLA Military 
RQ-2 PIONEER Microlight/CS-VLA CS-VLA Military 
T-16 ARCTURUS Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
APOENA 3000 Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
RQ-1 PREDATOR CS-23 Single Engine  CS-23 M<6000 lbs 
reciprocating 
Military 
MQ 9 REAPER  CS-23 Twin/CS-25 
aeroplanes 
CS-23 commuters CS-23 M<6000 lbs 
reciprocating 
RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK CS-25 aeroplanes CS-23 commuters CS-23 M<6000 lbs 
reciprocating
nEUROn  CS-23 commuters CS-23 M<6000 lbs 
reciprocating 
EADS BARRACUDA CS-25 aeroplanes CS-23 M>6000/commuters CS-23 M>6000 lbs 
X-45 A CS-25 aeroplanes CS-23 commuters CS-23 M<6000 lbs 
reciprocating 
IAI SEARCHER  Microlight/CS-VLA CS-VLA Military
RQ 5 HUNTER CS-23 Single Engine  CS-23 M<6000 lbs 
reciprocating 
Military 
MANTARRAYA Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
RADIO PLANE OQ 2 Microlight/CS-VLA Ultralight Military
TREK AEROSPACE 
DRAGONFLY 
CS-27 CS-VLA/CS-23 M<600 lbs 
reciprocating
Military 
Table 2.- Applicable airworthiness code(s) for the selected UAS following the methodology developed by EASA. 
 
being the most appropriated ones: α=106 J, β=100 J 
and ps=0,5. 
Using equations (1) and (2), the values for TGI,min 
have been estimated for the 23 selected UAS and the 
results have been compared with those obtained for a 
group of real UAS by Dalamagkidis et al (26, 27). 
The results are plotted in Figure 3. The continuous 
line show the linear correlation (in log scale) 
presented in (26, 27) for the requirement versus the 
MTOW and the dotted line is a linear upper envelope, 
which corresponds to multiplying the requirement 
derived by 3. The selected UAS fall within the margin 
between the two lines and demonstrates the existence 
of a linear behaviour between MTOW and TGI,min. 
Using this figure Dalamagkidis et al derived a 
classification of UAS based in the order of magnitude 
of their MTOW (and correspondingly of their TGI,min), 
where each subsequent class will require an accident 
rate an order of magnitude smaller than the previous. 
The classification can be consulted at (26, 27), and 
Table 3 shows the application of this classification 
method to the UAS considered in the present work. 
On comparing Tables 1 and 2 with Table 3 the first 
conclusion that can be extracted is that the results are 
quite different. The EASA’s methodologies associate 
more complex codes to the UAS than the TGI 
method. While EASA recommends using CS-VLA, 
the TGI method chooses the FAA’s AC 91-57 (13). 
The difference is very notorious because the AC91-
57 is an Advisory Circular for model aircraft 
meanwhile the CS-VLA is a formal code for very 
light fixed-wing single-engined aircraft, with a 
MTOW lower than 750 kg. For larger UAS, the TGI 
method associates FAR Part 103 (Ultralight Vehicles; 
empty weight lower than 115 kg) and FAR Part 23, 
while the EASA’s method assign CS-23 and CS-25 
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Figure 3.- The calculated TGI requirement (solid 
line) versus the corresponding MTOW for the UAS 
selected following (26,27). Dashed line represents 
three times the TGI requirement, and dots are the 
UAS selected. 
 
 Category (TGI,min)  
ALADIN Mini (AC91-57)
MANTA Mini (AC91-57) 
FULMAR Mini (AC91-57)
FUROS Mini (AC91-57)
TARIDAN MASTIFF Small (AC91-57) 
LIPÁN M3 Small (AC91-57) 
RHEINMETALL KZO Small (AC91-57)
OUTRIDER 
TACTICAL UAV Small (AC91-57) 
RQ-2 PIONEER Small (AC91-57)
T-16 ARCTURUS Small (AC91-57)
RQ-1 PREDATOR Light (FAR103/23) 
MQ 9 REAPER  Light (FAR103/23)
RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK Light/Normal (FAR 23)
EADS BARRACUDA Light (FAR103/23) 
X-45 A Light (FAR103/23) 
IAI SEARCHER  Small/Light
RQ 5 HUNTER Light (FAR103/23)
MANTARRAYA Small (AC91-57) 
RADIO PLANE OQ 2 Small (AC91-57) 
TREK AEROSPACE 
DRAGONFLY Small (AC91-57) 
CL-327 GUARDIAN Small (AC91-57) 
 
Table 3.- Classification, for certification purposes, 
based on TGI,min requirements (26,27) for the selected 
UAS. 
 
for the larger UAS. Essentially the EASA’s 
philosophy associates more formal codes to the 
different UAS, so the requirements to be applied to 
the future UAS will be more demanding than in the 
TGI method.  
Finally, the impact of the associated codes to each 
UAS is presented. The regulatory framework for the 
analysis is the one selected in the EASA Policy 
Statement, so the codes are listed in the first column 
of Table 1. In order to quantify the effect of applying 
the EASA’s code to every UAS, it is important to 
notice that a key feature of actual UAS is their low 
wing loading. This aspect makes them very sensitive 
to gusts and thus, the maximum limit load factor 
usually comes from the analysis of the gust response. 
Assuming that this is the case for the selected UAS, 
the positive gust limit load factor has been calculated 
for each UAS following the Pratt discrete gust criteria 
recommended in the CS-VLA, CS-23 and CS-25 
regulations for the cruise design speed. The 
calculations have been made twice, applying two 
scenarios: in one case, the cruise design speed has 
been established as the real maximum cruise velocity 
of each UAS, obtained from the manufacturer data. In 
the other case, the design cruise speed has been 
established following the associated EASA code 
(column 1, Table 1).  The gust intensity is 50 fps (at 
sea level and decreasing linearly with altitude) and 
the altitude, the manufacturer’s altitude for each 
UAS. In the majority of the UAS the second value is 
substantially greater than the first one, so the positive 
limit gust load factor does the same. 
Moreover, it is well known that a relationship exists 
between the limit load factor (the maximum of 
maneuver and gust load factors) and the structural 
weight, and there are conceptual methods for 
estimating this weight in which the limit load factor is 
an explicit parameter (29, 30, 31). The previous 
references show also several procedures for 
estimating the structural weight in terms of the 
MTOW, for different aircraft categories. Table 4 
shows the results obtained for the structural weight of 
the selected UAS after applying the Roskam’s (30) 
method: first the UAS structural weight is estimated 
in terms of the “real” limit load factor as a fraction of 
the MTOW (the selected fractions change with the 
aircraft category, according (30)); and second, the 
structural weight is obtained according to the EASA 
code limit load factor (this new structural weight 
comes also from Roskam (30)). Table 4 also collects 
the “real” and “regulations” gust limit load factors for 
comparison purposes. 
When comparing the values for the gust load factor, 
there are two different situations. On one hand, there 
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 "Real" 
ng 
"Regulations" 
ng 
"Real" 
Wstr 
"Regulations" 
Wstr 
Regs 
Wstr/Real 
Wstr  
  kg kg % 
ALADIN 6,61 6,61 0,64 0,64 0,00 
MANTA 3,36 5,64 5,93 7,03 18,52 
FULMAR 4,19 6,17 4,28 4,86 13,48 
FUROS 6,45 7,24 2,35 2,44 3,77 
TARIDAN 
MASTIFF
2,67 4,46 29,53 34,94 18,31 
LIPÁN M3 5,25 5,98 12,84 13,39 4,27 
RHEINMETALL 
KZO 
3,43 3,89 34,45 35,88 4,14 
OUTRIDER 
TACTICAL 
UAV 
2,28 3,76 37,39 44,03 17,76 
RQ-2 PIONEER 2,88 4,52 43,68 50,66 15,98 
T-16 
ARCTURUS
5,34 6,43 7,92 8,40 6,12 
APOENA 3000 3,43 5,19 17,55 20,08 14,42 
RQ-1 
PREDATOR
2,78 4,56 266,76 309,64 16,08 
MQ 9 REAPER  2,08 2,84 1485,12 1626,96 9,55 
RQ-4 GLOBAL 
HAWK 
1,50 2,16 3422,00 3846,69 12,41 
nEUROn 1,66 1,91 2028,00 2109,97 4,04 
EADS 
BARRACUDA 
2,81 2,81 958,75 958,75 0,00 
X-45 A 2,30 2,30 1630,76 1630,76 0,00 
IAI SEARCHER  3,10 4,75 91,16 104,83 14,99 
RQ 5 HUNTER 2,36 4,13 226,51 268,24 18,42 
MANTARRAYA 4,58 4,58 12,84 12,84 0,00 
RADIO PLANE 
OQ 2 
4,67 5,75 10,06 10,75 6,93 
Table 4.- Real UAS gust limit load factor and structural weight, and calculated values according EASA selected 
manned airworthiness code. 
are four cases in which the load factor does not 
change. This fact suggests that the manufacturer has 
considered the EASA associated code as the design 
standard. On the other hand, the most UAS 
experience remarkable changes in the limit load 
factor up to 75% higher in the worst case. These 
changes also imply appreciable changes in the aircraft 
structure to withstand such loads, increasing the 
structural weight. The variation in the structural 
weight is depicted, in Figure 4, in terms of the kinetic 
energy. In this Figure the different UAS have been 
grouped in different boxes depending on the 
associated manned airworthiness code, resembling 
Figure 2 from the EASA A-NPA and Policy 
Statement.  
The changes in structural weight not only represent a 
change in the UAS structural design, but also 
influence on other design aspects. For instance, in the 
majority of the cases with an increase in the structural 
weight, this results in the manufacturer’s declared 
maximum cruise velocity being different from the 
design cruise speed. This last speed is greater than the 
declared one, so the loads calculated for the design 
cruise speed derived from the code for the same gust 
intensity are greater. But it also means that the 
powerplant installed in the UAS may not be capable 
of reaching this higher speed, so a need for a stronger 
powerplant arises. The installation of a new engine 
may introduce new modifications in the UAS design, 
opening the door of a complete UAS refurbishment.  
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Figure 4.- Structural weight increase (%) for the UAS 
selected in terms of the kinetic energy. 
So, if an airworthiness manned aircraft code is 
applied to an existing UAS perhaps this UAS could 
not be certified under that code, unless a complete set 
of major modifications are implemented on that UAS. 
In some cases these modifications would not be 
possible.  
4 Conclusions 
A comprehensive outlook of the regulatory 
framework for UAS has been presented. If the actual 
market for civil UAS wants to grow, it will be 
necessary to integrate the operations of such vehicles 
into the same air space (non segregated) than the 
manned aircraft. To reach such scenario, a set of 
airworthiness codes or standards will have to be 
elaborated in order to ensure the same safety levels 
than the conventional aircraft. Although the actual 
initiatives are somewhat confusing and disperse, the 
EASA Policy Statement is a remarkable basis for the 
new regulatory process.  
The comparison of the EASA Policy Statement with 
other philosophies shows that this one is a restrictive 
approach, so a guarantee of safety. The case study 
applied to twenty-three state-of-the-art UAS confirms 
this result.  
Most UAS assessed would not be able to comply with 
the EASA codes, essentially for they would not 
withstand the gust loads, due to a low structural 
weight. This could imply that the powerplant would 
not be adequate to develop the cruise design speed 
required in the airworthiness code. The former 
conclusions indicate that the manufacturers of future 
UAS should take the EASA code (or an alternative 
equivalent) from the first steps of the design process 
to avoid troubles in the certification. 
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